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Workers’ Compensation Reemployment Programs
Options for Modifying the Pension System
1.

Statement of the Issues–The Role of Pensions
This paper seeks to lay out some alternative possible measures that could be employed in

an effort to strengthen the workers’ compensation program in Washington. In particular we are
aware of criticism over the approach to pensions for work injuries, including frequent reference
to a need to reduce the rate of awarding pensions for work injuries and illnesses. At the outset we
wish to make entirely clear that we expressly favor no option over any other, including leaving
the system unchanged. This work is meant to describe some options that policymakers face and
to suggest some of the strengths and shortcomings of various approaches. We recognize that any
result of an ultimate policy decision can be viewed favorably by some and with dissatisfaction by
others. Our hope is that this report allows a wide range of choices to be considered.
In a previous report that we prepared for the Department of Labor and Industries, we
found that the incidence of pensions under Washington’s workers’ compensation program
appeared to be very high and out of line with the experience of most jurisdictions in the U.S. 1
This was consistent with the views held by many others, both within and outside the state
agency. Some features of the Washington state system make it difficult to precisely compare the
incidence of pensions to that found in other states, but our judgment was that the level and the
rate of pensions among those with time-loss claims was also growing at a significant rate. Our
report suggested a number of reasons for this growth as well as rejecting some other possible
sources of the increase.
Our 2008 report was basically descriptive, and it did not include policy recommendations
or possible steps that the State could take to diminish the number of pensions to be awarded in
the future. What follows in this report are not our recommendations about steps that should or
could be taken, but instead a list of possible measures including some taken by other jurisdictions
to deal with the issue.

1

Barth, Grob, Harder, Hunt, and Silverstein 2008.

1
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2.

Outline of Current Approach to Pensions
If we exclude those cases involving extraordinarily serious impairments that are listed in

the Washington statute, 2 the basis of awarding a pension to an injured worker is shown in the
statute as a “… condition permanently incapacitating the worker from performing any work at
any gainful occupation.” 3 The listed or specific injuries are very few in number, and not of
interest in this paper. Many states incorporate such lists in their statutes. Similarly, a sizable
number of states use employability or work performance standards criteria for awarding
permanent total disability benefits. What sets Washington apart from almost all other states using
this standard is that Washington awards permanent partial disability benefits on the basis of
impairment only. While some other states use this criterion for permanent partial awards, they
use impairment also when evaluating workers for permanent total disability status. In
Washington, the very large majority of permanent partial disability awards are for relatively low
rated impairments, meaning that the typical beneficiary receives a relatively small benefit. Yet
where the worker has had difficulty resuming work in the labor market, a very large gap is
created between the permanent partial award and a potential lifetime pension. In evaluating the
worker’s (economic) condition, the adjudicator is left with a very difficult decision. The
permanent partial disability benefit can be perceived as inadequate and all that can be done for
the worker is to leave him/her on time-loss benefits or award a pension. 4
3.

Pensions as a System Feature
In considering the use of pensions in Washington, we believe that it is critical that they

are recognized as just one element embedded within the compensation system. Other parts of the
workers’ compensation program affect it and are in turn affected by the state’s use of pensions.
While one could attempt to “fix” the pension question by dealing only with the process of
granting pensions, in our view other parts of the state’s workers’ compensation program
contribute substantially to the matter. As a result, changes in the pension program can result from
adjustments in other parts of the system. Of course this is not unique to Washington and is true in
2

“Permanent total disability” means loss of both legs, or arms, or one leg and one arm, total loss of
eyesight, paralysis. RCW 51.08.160 (2008).
3

RCW 51.08.160 (2008).

4

We recognize that another alternative decision that can be made and in the past was frequently applied
was to send and resend the worker into the vocational rehabilitation system.

2
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all workers’ compensation programs. However, it is particularly noteworthy here because the
likelihood of pensions in Washington seems inextricably linked to the incidence of time-loss
claims of very long durations. The numbers of long-term time-loss claims serve as an important
predictor of the future of pensions.
Long-term time-loss claims also represent an important cost driver in the state system. A
policy focused exclusively on driving down pensions in order to save system costs would be
ineffective in achieving that goal, if it was accomplished simply by retaining individuals with
active time-loss claims in that status. In that case, benefits would continue to be paid and simply
called something other than a pension. 5 Our previous report notes that during certain periods in
the past, policy decisions to reduce the numbers of claimants with very long-term time-loss
claims led to moving some into pension status, swelling the roles there.
4.

Pensions Are Viewed as a Liberal Entitlement Program in Washington
We believe that pensions are considered to be both a desirable and a significant part of

the system of workers’ compensation in Washington. We recognize that the perception of an
appropriate state system may have more in common with Washington’s neighbor to the north,
British Columbia, than with other states in the region or across much of the U.S. (Note, for
example, that there were only 10 new permanent total disability [PTD] awards in Oregon, along
with one previous award rescinded, in 2008. Oregon’s Court of Appeals had not granted a single
PTD award in the 10 years ending in 2008. 6) The implication is that efforts to limit the number
or the future growth of pensions in Washington will be challenged by many who will consider
such practices as fair and reasonable, whereas the practices in other states with less liberal
programs regarding pensions are irrelevant or an unacceptable norm for the state.
Our experience in other jurisdictions has taught us that even when laws or regulations or
state agency practices are changed, implementing “reforms” can be frustrated by attitudes
created by past practices. In short, the courts and appeals bodies and hearing officers become
accustomed to viewing claims in a certain way, creating a tendency to grant similar outcomes to
workers with comparable conditions and circumstances as they would have done prior to the law
change. The implication of this is that very significant changes in the pension system in

5

We know that this is not entirely true for the self-insured employer as we recognized in the 2008 report.

6

Reed 2008.
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Washington are likely to be met with continuing resistance even after possible enactment, and
the results will be slow to be manifested as legal and other challenges are posed.
5.

Limitations of this Paper
In this paper we do not include a discussion of administrative procedures within the

Department of Labor & Industries, or the appellate bodies that adjudicate claims for pensions.
Some of those issues have been described in other reports and studies and our focus here is
primarily on those matters that might be considered for legislative action.
6.

Options for the Temporary Disability (TD) System
While there are many elements of the temporary disability benefits methodology

employed by L&I that have been assessed over the years by L&I and others, the following
discussion focuses solely on issues that relate very directly to permanent disability and pensions.
6.A.

Leave the TD system as it is and rely simply on changes in the permanent

disability system.
Choosing this option has several implications. Compensation for temporary disability
affects the largest number of injured workers receiving indemnity benefits. Our previous work
revealed few significant criticisms from stakeholders about the existing approach to temporary
disability, although more might have emerged had our study’s focus not been directed
specifically to pensions issues. Additionally, Washington’s approach is broadly similar to that
found in the other states. Leaving the system as it is would likely minimize disruption to all
persons familiar with the current approach. Staff at L&I would need no retraining to learn the
approach.
Almost all pension cases enter into the WC system as temporary disability claims.
Measures taken at the earliest stages following work injuries may contribute to reducing the
usage of pensions. It may be necessary to weigh the costs of adjusting the approach to temporary
disability against the benefit of reducing the future incidence of pension cases.

4
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6.B.

Modify the approach to TD compensation in ways that can contribute to a

less inclusive pensions program.
The key to this change or changes would be to recognize the linkage that exists between
pension awards and claims that remain active or open over long periods of time. 7
6.B.1. Set a maximum period of time for which temporary disability benefits will be
paid. A number of jurisdictions statutorily impose maximum periods of time for which
temporary benefits can be paid. The goal of this approach, aside from cost reduction, is to give
injured workers a clear understanding that benefits will end at some point and measures must be
taken by them to provide for that eventuality, presumably returning to work. (One minor
complication to be considered is whether the maximum time period applies to the number of
weeks that passed since indemnity benefits have started or the number of weeks for which
indemnity benefits have been paid.)
The overwhelming majority of injured workers would be unaffected by adopting such an
approach, unless the maximum period before benefits were terminated would be set at a low
threshold. Those most likely to be affected would be some of those workers on the path to
becoming very long-term claims resulting ultimately in a pension.
Some of the largest states have such limits. California, Florida, and Texas have limits on
the period of temporary disability set at 104 or 105 weeks, with some limited exceptions
possible. For example, the 105 weeks can be extended in Texas in instances where spinal surgery
has been performed late in the claim period. Some jurisdictions have limits of significantly
greater maximum duration. As an example, the period for which temporary total disability
benefits are paid cannot run for over 500 weeks in Indiana, South Carolina, and Virginia.
Setting the bar this high raises certain questions. In most states, the virtually routine use
of compromise and release agreements makes such limits academic, in the sense that temporary
benefits rarely reach the point where the statutory limit will be invoked to have benefits ended.
However, the restriction can have some impact on the size of the settlement. A potential lifetime
benefit is seen as costlier by an insurer than one with a specific end date, thus making the insurer
willing to pay a higher price to settle the former. However, the present value of a benefit that
might have to be paid only after 400 or 500 weeks have passed is relatively small.

7

This linkage is detailed in our 2008 report and has been reported frequently by L&I’s actuaries.
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In most jurisdictions setting a limit on temporary disability benefits of even three to four
years would not be greeted with as much opposition as would many other changes in the
approach to temporary disability compensation. Aside from affecting only a small proportion of
injured workers, the termination of temporary disability benefits would likely be followed with
some injured workers receiving a permanent disability benefit. However, given Washington’s
current system and its history of having a relatively high rate of very long-term claims, one could
expect far greater opposition to this sort of change than one might elsewhere.
A variation on an approach that limits the period of temporary total disability is found in
states that place limits on the maximum period that injured workers can receive benefits for the
combined period of receipt of both temporary disability benefits and permanent partial disability
benefits. Another variant places a limit on the combined dollar amount of temporary and
permanent partial disability benefits. Setting limits on the combined benefits is likely to reduce
the incentive to collect temporary disability benefits for prolonged periods of time.
6.B.2. Terminate the payment of indemnity benefits for temporary disability when the
injured worker is found to be at maximum medical improvement (MMI). Currently, a
Washington worker receiving temporary disability benefits can continue to receive time-loss
benefits after the worker has reached MMI if there is no determination that the worker is capable
of returning to gainful employment. In many, if not most jurisdictions, MMI alone is grounds for
terminating temporary disability benefits. If there is a residual impairment (or disability) those
states would then rate the worker for a permanent disability award.
The prospect of earlier benefit termination, at the point of MMI alone, is likely both to
encourage some injured workers to begin to seek employment, if they have not already done so,
and to obtain possible permanent partial disability benefits. It is at this point that
insurer/employers and injured workers typically will settle permanent disability cases with
settlement agreements that result in closing down the claim. (This issue will be discussed under
the discussion of options for modifying permanent disability compensation.)
In the Washington system, temporary total disability payments will be terminated,
typically, if the worker is found to have reached MMI and a health care provider reports that the
person is able to return to work. These are separate issues and either one or both can be disputed.
Were Washington to move to an approach that terminates benefits when the worker is found to

6
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have reached MMI, it would remove at least one of the possible sources of dispute over the issue
of ending temporary disability payments.
6.B.3. Reduce the wage replacement rate as the period on temporary disability
benefits grows longer. Several jurisdictions lower the rate or level of weekly benefits after a
period of time has passed during which the worker has received temporary disability benefits. 8
Reducing the weekly compensation benefit can serve as an inducement for a worker to speed up
the period of recovery and hasten the return to work. Such a policy would aim less at the cost
savings resulting directly from a reduced weekly benefit but more from the indirect effect of
reducing the length of time for which the worker receives temporary disability compensation.
The wage-replacement rate for temporary total disability in Ohio is 72 percent, but it is
reduced to 66 2/3 percent after 12 weeks of benefits. In Texas, the wage-replacement rate for
most workers is set at 70 percent of their average weekly wage, but for those earning $8.50/hour
or less, the rate is initially set at 75 percent and reduced to 70 percent after 26 weeks. Cutting the
wage-replacement rate is very widely found in Australia’s workers’ compensation systems. For
most federal government (Commonwealth) workers, the wage-replacement rate for temporary
total disability is cut from 100 percent of the pre-injury wage to 75 percent after 45 weeks. 9 In
New South Wales, Australia’s largest state, the wage-replacement rate is cut after 26 weeks from
100 percent to a flat dollar amount, adjusted for the presence of dependents. In Victoria, the
second most populous state, the 95 percent temporary total disability compensation rate is
reduced to 75 percent after 13 weeks. It is likely that some would object to cutting the wagereplacement rate after a period of time has elapsed. These criticisms might be mooted somewhat
by increasing the wage-replacement rate for the initial period when done in conjunction with a
reduction after an interval of time has passed.
At one level lowering the wage-replacement rate in longer-duration claims may appear to
be counterintuitive, as these are the workers generally considered to have sustained more severe
or disabling injuries. Indeed, at least two jurisdictions in North America increase the wage8

Middle to lower paid federal employees covered by the Federal Employees Compensation Act also have
the value of their temporary benefits reduced after 45 days, though this applies only to those with occupational
injuries and not to those with occupational diseases. Some of this is a result of the tax-free status of their benefits
compared with their after-tax income from wages and the continuation of pay practice for 45 days in cases of
occupational injuries which is not paid in cases of occupational diseases.
9

Wage replacement rates within other countries often appear high relative to U.S. jurisdictions. However,
cash benefits are usually subject to income taxes in those countries, unlike the U.S. approach.
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replacement rate for workers receiving temporary total disability benefits. Nova Scotia law
provides that the temporary total disability benefit rate be increased from 75 percent to 85
percent after 38 weeks and Prince Edward Island province hikes its rate of 80 percent to 85
percent after 26 weeks.
6.B.4. Enhance Return-to-Work Programs at the Temporary Disability Stage. Disability management for workers’ compensation claims attempts to interrupt or eliminate the
progression of an injury or disease to becoming a permanent disability. 10 Thus, disability
management is generally time specific and employer-employee relationship focused. However,
we are interested in system wide workers’ compensation policies and programs that encourage or
subsidize the practice of disability management by employers or insurers with the expectation
that this will lead to lower costs for employers and more satisfactory outcomes for injured
workers. We will review state practices that encourage the use of disability management in two
states to sample what is possible in this environment.
6.B.4.a.

Oregon Employer-at-Injury Program 11

The state of Oregon is renowned among the states for having the most aggressive returnto-work (RTW) orientation. They maintain a focus on RTW at the temporary disability level as
well as for those with permanent work-related disabilities. We will consider the Employer-atInjury Program (EAIP) here because it seeks to enhance the RTW rates for workers while they
are still on temporary disability benefits.
The EAIP was introduced in 1993 in Oregon. It applies to employers who secure
temporary medical releases from treating sources specifying that a particular injured worker is
able to return to light-duty jobs that are transitional in nature. This can occur even before the
worker has exhausted the three-day waiting period for wage-replacement benefits to begin. The
employer receives a 50 percent wage subsidy for up to three months, as well as financial
assistance for necessary worksite modifications and other associated costs of accommodating the
injured worker. Insurers who assist in the process are paid a flat fee of $120 for each placement.
They also have the right to terminate time-loss benefits if the worker refuses an EAIP placement.
Injured workers can refuse the EAIP offer if the job requires a commute of more than 50 miles
10

A broader discussion of the concept of disability management is found in section 9, below.

11

See the 2008 Biennial Report on the Oregon Workers’ Compensation System, pp. 51-54 for a full
description of the Oregon Employer-at-Injury Program and its results.
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(or is beyond the worker’s capacity), or if the job is not with the employer at injury (or not at the
same worksite of that employer), or if the job offer is inconsistent with either the employer’s past
practice or the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.
From its introduction in 1993 the utilization of EAIP increased rapidly to include over
10,000 worker placements and 1,775 employers by 1998. Thereafter, participation declined
somewhat but in 2007 there were 7,752 EAIP placements involving 1,793 employers. 12 This is
from an employment base of 1.76 million with 23,433 disabling claims. 13 So the EAIP
placements involved up to one-third of all disabling claims. 14
Oregon uses a state-of-the-art “Program Evaluation Model” which gathers quarterly
employment and earnings data from the Oregon Employment Department to evaluate the
outcomes of EAIP and other RTW programs. They measure program success by comparing
employment and earnings levels for EAIP workers and non-program workers in the 13th quarter
after injury. For the 2004 injury cohort, the increase in employment levels 13 quarters after
injury was 5 percent; with the EAIP employment rate of 76 percent compared to the non-EAIP
employment rate of 71 percent. 15 Further, a recent follow-up study of EAIP users from 1998
indicates that the average EAIP placed worker earned $10,318 more than the matched non-users
over the following five years. 16 They did not estimate the employer/insurer savings from this
program, but presumably there were substantial cost savings involved there also.
6.B.4.b.

Ohio “Remain at Work” Program

Ohio promotes their “Remain at Work” program as a “healthy approach to staying
productive.” This is part of a comprehensive disability management program (Health Partnership
Program) which will be described more fully below. The idea behind “Remain at Work” is to

12

Oregon Biennial Report, 2008, Fig. 17, p. 54.

13

Workers’ Compensation Claim Characteristics, Calendar Year 2007.

14

This fraction is somewhat uncertain because some of the EAIP claims may involve non-disabling claims,
as mentioned above, and some may involve claims from prior years.
15

It is also worth noting that Oregon includes both the rate of “Reemployment for Injured Workers” and
the degree of “Wage Recovery for Injured Workers” in their “Key Measure Analysis” of the workers’ compensation
system performance.
16

Maier, Helmer, and Tokarczyk 2009.
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prevent workers with medical-only claims from progressing to wage-replacement (time-loss)
benefits (i.e., keeping below seven days lost from work due to the injury or disease).
Ohio uses a set of 18 approved Managed Care Organizations (MCOs) to handle the injury
reporting, medical management, and claims management functions under the workers’
compensation law. Each insured employer selects one of the approved MCOs to handle their
workers’ compensation claims. 17 The MCO has responsibility for the rapid reporting of workers’
compensation claims to the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (BWC) and arranging necessary
medical treatment, including specialist referrals, paying and managing medical bills, resolving
medical disputes, etc. Anyone can contact the appropriate Managed Care Organization on behalf
of the injured worker, and a comprehensive range of disability management services can be
made available to the injured worker, at the discretion of the MCO. As we shall see later, this is
only one aspect of the comprehensive approach to disability management in Ohio.
Obviously this “Remain at Work” program potentially serves as a very early intervention
program, which requires the cooperation of the employer and the medical provider, as well as the
injured worker. Ohio BWC recently sponsored an external review by Deloitte which included the
performance of the MCOs. 18 According to that report, “The percentage change in average
medical costs on lost-time claims for Ohio is consistently less than NCCI subscribers for 2003 to
2006.” In general they gave the Ohio MCO system high marks for effectiveness.
While the RTW aspect of MCO performance was not part of the Deloitte review, it seems
clear that the MCOs also spearhead the Ohio disability management approach to return to work
on behalf of the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation. They do this by keeping the critical actors,
the injured worker, the employer, and the medical provider, fully informed of the developments
in the claim and communicating with each other. This is the first step to a successful disability
management intervention.
7.

Options for the Permanent Partial Disability System
The linkage between the permanent partial disability system and pension awards is both

obvious and highly significant. We described a key element in our previous report. Workers in
Washington who are eligible to receive a permanent partial disability award receive a benefit

17

Self-insured employers are not included in the program.

18

See Deloitte Report 2.6, 2009, p. 6.
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whose size is solely a function of the degree of impairment. The extent of the impairment is
evaluated by a health care professional with standards set by medical guides. Impairments that
are rated as less serious will receive a relatively smaller benefit than will a person with a greater
degree of impairment. Workers with the same degree of impairment will be entitled to the same
amount of compensation, regardless of differences in pre-injury wages, their ages, and number of
dependents. This approach is frequently found in other states in the U.S. and in other parts of the
world as well.
This “impairment” method of compensation has certain strengths as well as
shortcomings. Generally, it appears easier to administer this approach than some alternative
methods used for permanent partial disabilities. As such, it should result in relatively fewer
disputes; fewer issues should be subject to dispute, and the disputes can be resolved in a more
objective manner. Under the “impairment” approach disputes over the degree of permanent
disability are centered on the ratings given by medical professionals. Using uniform rating guides
as well as medical neutrals to resolve differing evaluations (rather than “dueling docs”) provides
a satisfactory mechanism to resolve these disputes.
The primary shortcoming of the “impairment” approach is that it does not consider the
economic loss that is suffered by an individual worker due to a work injury. To the extent that
the “impairment” approach seeks to compensate for economic loss, it aims to deal with some
(unspecified) average loss that all workers with similar degrees of impairment sustain. The result
is that providing compensation based on presumed average losses means that some injured
workers find that they are under compensated for their economic losses, and of course some
others are overcompensated.
In Washington the “impairment” approach is not the basis for the finding of permanent
total disability. We believe that placing one criterion for evaluating permanent partial disability
alongside a different methodology for evaluating permanent total disability constitutes a central
problem for the L&I pension system. The following are some options regarding the existing
permanent partial disability (PPD) system that would impact the pension program.
7.A.

Leave the PPD system as it is and rely simply on changes in the permanent

total disability system to deal with the pensions issue.
Choosing this option has several implications. Our previous work revealed few
significant criticisms from stakeholders about the current approach to compensating PPD cases,
11
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although more might have emerged had our study’s focus not been directed specifically to
pensions issues. Additionally, Washington’s approach is broadly similar to that found in a
sizable number of states. Leaving the system as it is would likely minimize disruption to all
persons familiar with the current approach. Staff at L&I would need no retraining to learn the
new approach. Health care providers are apparently familiar with the rating process and what is
expected of them.
Our experience in other states suggests that fundamental changes in the way that PPD
claims are evaluated can be difficult to implement. Attorneys, workers and their representatives,
insurers, employers, and health care professionals become accustomed to valuing certain
impairments for compensation purposes. The monetary or disability value of a given claim is
generally well understood, at least within a narrow range, by practitioners with experience in the
state’s system. Just as “old habits die hard,” the tendency is to evaluate cases as they always
have, even if a new approach is mandated, while paying lip service to the new method of rating.
Adjudicators and the courts also can drag their feet even when legislative changes appear to
bring about significant changes in the way permanent disability is to be evaluated.
When SB 899 (2004) in California changed the basic approach to evaluating the degree
of permanent disability, fierce resistance to the changes manifested itself. Recently, the
California Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board handed down rulings that seem to reverse the
direction taken by the 2004 legislation. The cases in question are likely to be appealed to the
California Courts of Appeal and then on to the state Supreme Court. 19
Another example of this with a similar type of inertia, resulting in the outcomes being
reversed, can be found in Vermont. The statute was amended in 1999, thereby loosening the
longstanding approach to the finding of permanent total disability. 20 Legislation that appeared to
widen the eligibility criteria for the awarding of permanent total disability has not succeeded,
however, as the Supreme Court seems to have hung on to the previous approach set out in a 1982
decision 21.

19

Taylor 2009.

20

Described in Kolter and Doolittle, 2006.

21

Bishop v. Town of Barre, 140 VT. 564, 571 (1982).
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7.B.

Allow permanent partial disability claims to be closed with compromise and

release (C&Rs) agreements.
We recognize that this option is one of the most contentious issues presently confronting
the Washington’s workers’ compensation system. The use of such settlements would help to
solve some of the challenges associated with the pension system, but it is not without its own
difficulties. The use of this practice can also be employed to close down claims while they are at
the temporary total disability stage and before they are treated as permanent partial disability
claims. It is discussed here rather than under the temporary disability section as the use of such
agreements is found so much more frequently in permanent partial disability cases. Here are
some implications of employing this option.
A historic reason for the aversion to using lump-sum settlements has been that some
workers have been unable to use the proceeds prudently. Instead, if the “pot of gold” is
squandered quickly, the worker is left without the resources that are needed to compensate for
any lost earnings due to the work injury. The problem may be more acute for those injured
workers who have seldom, if ever, had immediate access to a significant amount of money.
In most jurisdictions where C&Rs are commonly used to end permanent disability cases,
the settlement typically seals off future liability for the insurer, not only for indemnity benefits
but also for any health care costs associated with the work injury. The result can be that the
worker is left without adequate resources to pay for health care and is dependent on public
support or other means to cover those costs, or do without the treatment completely. In some
instances, the worker who is found to be eligible for Social Security Disability Insurance can
expect Medicare to pay for some future medical costs, though the issue is clouded as the federal
government does not accept the position of primary payer ahead of the workers’ compensation
benefit. Six states do not allow compromise and agreements that release future medical expenses:
Arizona, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Oregon, Tennessee, and West Virginia (occupational
disease cases only). 22
In Tennessee, C&Rs cannot initially close out future medical. Only after three years have
passed from the settlement date of a permanent partial disability claim can there be an agreement
to release future medical. In cases of permanent total disability, future medical can never be

22

In private correspondence from David B. Torrey, Oct. 23, 2008, to the author.
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released. If there is a dispute over the issue of compensability itself or of the amount of
compensation due, a C&R can close out the claim but the amount of compensation cannot
exceed 50 times the state’s minimum weekly benefit and the employee is not entitled to any
future medical benefits for that claim. 23 Although this practice limits the scope of the release
agreements, it has not led to the abandonment of the practice. Torrey points out that when West
Virginia law was amended to allow settlement agreements in 2003 to release future medical, the
use of C&Rs became more frequent. He also notes a Michigan case in 1966 where an amicus
brief submitted by insurance carriers argued that “'No one would ever think of entering into an
agreement to redeem a case in part and leave open the possibility of future litigation over
medical care.”
Some objection to compromise and release agreements along with a lump-sum benefit is
raised by those who fear that experienced insurance company staff will regularly seek bargains
that are disadvantageous to workers, recognizing the worker’s relative inexperience in matters of
workers’ compensation. This inequality of bargaining power brought about by the “experience
factor” can be exacerbated where the insurer delays or denies some benefits in order to weaken
the worker’s position. This has been termed “starvation therapy” by insurance company critics.
Such practices can be mitigated by penalties imposed on insurers for unreasonably delaying or
denying the payment of benefits, (from fines to loss of operating licenses, or to discontinuance of
permission to self-insure), by vigilantly reviewing C&R agreements before they are approved by
the state, and by enabling law suits against a carrier or employer for a failure to act in “good
faith.” 24 However, the tendency appears to be for states to be less reliant on reviews of C&Rs,
and states that now regularly omit such reviews include Florida, Alabama, and Alaska. 25
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Tenn Code Ann. 50-6-206.
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While most states that allow C&Rs require that they be reviewed by a state agency or court, in most
instances the reviews are pro forma. More thorough reviews may be limited to agreements where the worker is
unrepresented. This was acknowledged, effectively, in Florida when the mandatory review by Judges of
Compensation Claims was dropped by legislation, in accepted claims and where the worker was represented,
Fl. Stat. 440.12(11)(c)(2001). See McConnaughhay and Moniz 2002. However, the role of Judges of
Compensation Claims has not been as circumscribed as it seemed initially. See Bolton 2009. David Torrey
notes a trend by states to move towards less regulation in the use of C&Rs. One authority on C&Rs has
observed: Of note is that the trial bar, the injured worker community’s only advocate, is not as a group vocally
in opposition to the trend. In Pennsylvania, organized labor has raised an eyebrow at the popularity of C&Rs
but is not, and has not been, a voice counseling moderation in the practice. Torrey 2007.
25

Torrey 2007.
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Some of these concerns about insurance company practices may be less troubling to
critics of C&Rs because of L&I’s role as an exclusive state fund. However, some individuals and
groups ascribe to L&I the same type of profit seeking behavior that they believe motivate private
sector insurance companies. There remains also the issue of self insured employers and thirdparty administrators.
Denying workers the opportunity to take benefits in the form of lump sums is regarded by
some as paternalistic. While some individuals may be unable to use a lump sum wisely, they
assert that others who are responsible should not be denied this chance to take their benefit in the
form that they choose. To some extent the problem of prudently using settlement money for
future medical needs due to the work injury can be mitigated. First, compromise and release
settlements need not involve payments as lump sums. Instead, structured settlements allow a
trustee to obtain the lump sum from the insurer/employer and make payments periodically from
the award. In such cases workers are aware of the size of the settlement in terms of a lump sum
though they do not receive it all in a single installment. Most jurisdictions in the U.S. that allow
C&Rs require some approval process by a judge or workers’ compensation administrator to
make certain that the worker understands the terms of the agreement, that on its face the
agreement is fair to the worker, and that the worker is aware of the issue of possible future
medical needs. This review process is frequently a pro forma one, especially where the worker is
represented by counsel or an agent. However, it need not be a superficial review if the state is
committed to protecting the well being of the injured employee.
The fact that the use of C&Rs is so common across states is hardly surprising. The
stakeholders in workers’ compensation all appear to believe they benefit from their utilization.
Insurers and employers desire the final resolution of claims; “The only good claim is a closed
claim” is frequently one of the first things learned by the claims adjuster staff of insurers.
Multiple reasons exist for this preference. Many state workers’ compensation administrators
prefer this system as well. The settlement of the claim is left to the worker and the
insurer/employer, rather than being imposed by the agency or the courts. Letting the parties settle
the issues themselves means that fewer decisions and disputes need to be made by an agency or a
court that may already be overburdened. In some states the near unanimous view is that the state
agency could not possibly cope with the workload were it not for the availability and widespread
utilization of C&Rs.
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Attorneys, particularly plaintiff attorneys, tend to be strongly supportive of C&Rs.
Indeed, in some jurisdictions custom has evolved such that the attorney’s fee is tied directly to
the size of the final settlement, or the value of the indemnity portion of the settlement. While
some labor union representatives oppose the use of C&Rs or seek to have the practice ended,
they rarely assert this publicly as their members appear to support their use. Opposition to C&Rs
also arises from those who claim that the lump-sum payout serves to attract claimants who would
otherwise not seek the benefit, and it induces some to take measures to inflate the size of the
award. As an example, even in jurisdictions such as Washington that rate PPDs on the basis of
the degree of impairment, evaluators may consciously or otherwise increase the rating of a PPD
where the worker has been on temporary disability for a prolonged period. Thus, moving to a
system of C&Rs could lead to lengthier periods of temporary disability for some injured
workers.
Similarly, the worker may be more likely to seek out a medical provider known to be a
source of higher ratings. In some cases the worker may be more willing to submit to surgery if a
larger lump-sum settlement may be the result. Ironically, a worker may refuse surgery or other
needed treatment in the interest of obtaining a higher PPD rating. While some economists might
argue that the lump-sum payment and the periodic payout may have the same present value,
depending in part on the discount rate used, modern behavioral economics suggests that a lumpsum payout is seen by the worker as a superior benefit. To the extent that it is especially favored,
it can be linked to behavior that is not in the best interest of the worker, and may be costlier than
a system without (large) lump-sum settlements. Permitting the use of settlements that involve
lump sums seems likely to increase litigation over permanent partial disability, and to enlarge the
number of attorneys who will handle workers’ compensation claims. Many would see this as a
reason to oppose moving to allow use of C&Rs.
Where states allow C&Rs to close off an entitlement to vocational rehabilitation, it will
have several effects. First, it will tend to raise the cost of the settlement to the employer/insurer,
all other things remaining the same. It will also reduce the utilization of vocational rehabilitation,
a desired outcome for some stakeholders (employers and insurers), and an undesirable one for
others (providers). After Oregon changed its law in 1990, it led to a drop-off in applications for
vocational rehabilitation as workers preferred the cash offered in a C&R. 26
26

Ballantyne 2008.
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Opponents of lump-sum payments can point to systems that provide some limited
flexibility so as to make them available in special circumstances. If a seriously impaired worker
has need for a lump sum for things such as starting a business with reasonable prospects for
success, for additional education, to prevent the foreclosure on a home, and so on, exceptions to
rules against the use of lump-sum benefits can be made. Where this exists a government agency,
including the workers’ compensation board, can be given the authority to waive the rule that
limits or restricts the use of lump-sum payments.
While C&Rs are meant to bring closure to claims, they do not always succeed in
accomplishing that. Disputes can arise over whether an injury is a “new” injury or a recurrence
or consequence of the one that was previously settled. Disputes over the possible reopening of a
C&R also occur where one of the parties claims that information was withheld or that false
information was provided. Of course, disputes over similar issues can arise even where a C&R is
not used. As an example, a worker in Washington may be rated for a permanent partial disability,
receive appropriate cash benefits, and then subsequently claim that the impairment has worsened
and that a new, higher rating (and benefit) is warranted. Some jurisdictions provide that some
period following the C&R will be allowed for a party to change their mind. Currently,
Washington allows cases that it has closed to be reopened at a later time. Were this practice to
continue, it would render the use of C&Rs less attractive for any insurer/employer. If cases that
are settled with C&Rs cannot be reopened, some provision could be made for extraordinary
cases where absolute closure would create some extreme inequity.
7.C.

Allow claims to be closed with compromise and release (C&Rs) agreements,

but only under very special circumstances.
One possibility is to allow the use of C&Rs where certain conditions are met. For
example, the desire of the parties to use a C&R could be used to further the return to work goal.
Consider the model that Texas uses where a commutation of impairment income (permanent
partial disability) benefits will be allowed, but only if the injured worker has returned to
employment for at least three months and is earning at least 80 percent of the employee’s preinjury average earnings. The Texas approach differs from a typical agreement that most states
allow as it is not a C&R. However, there is no reason that such an approach could not also be
utilized in the case of C&Rs. And there is no reason that 3 months or 80 percent are the only
figures that could be used. Were Washington to adopt this sort of approach it would provide an
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inducement both to the employer/insurer and the worker to return the injured employee to work
should they wish to have the use of a compromise and release settlement.
7.D.

Modify the current PPD rating approach by switching to a bifurcated one.

Among the reasons for the high rate of pensions in Washington is the inadequacy of
benefits for permanent partial disabilities in instances where workers have difficulty re-entering
the labor market following their injury. Providing precisely those persons with increased benefits
should reduce the need for pensions. An alternative approach to PPD compensation could
achieve that. In a bifurcated approach when a worker with a permanent impairment is rated
(presumably at the time that MMI has been reached) the worker can be rated based either on the
degree of impairment or on the degree of disability. The evaluation method to be used to rate a
worker would depend upon the criterion that is chosen. Most claims for a PPD would be rated
based on impairment, as currently.
One possibility would be to rate on the basis of disability only those workers who have
not returned to employment following their having reached MMI. Alternatively, a disability
rating would be used for those who have not returned to employment at or above 80 percent of
their pre-injury average weekly wage. (Note: our example here using 80 percent is an arbitrary
one.) Assuming the worker does return to employment and earns at or above the 80 percent level,
should the wage rate then fall below that or the worker lose employment within a year of the
rating, the method of rating could be modified to a disability rating. In the case where a disability
rating is employed, the impairment rating would be a floor on the rating, i.e., a disability rating
would always have to be equal to or greater than an impairment rating for that worker.
The British Columbia experience, as described briefly in our 2008 report may be
instructive. Until a recent change in the law, BC rated all permanently disabled workers on both
an impairment basis and a disability basis. The result was that the (higher of the two) disability
rating made superfluous the impairment rating. The intent of the law had been, however, for the
disability rating to be applied only in a minority of the claims. After a policy review the scheme
was modified and now the disability rating is assessed only in limited situations and the vast
majority of benefits are awarded on the basis of impairment alone. Still, in cases that can be
justified as “exceptional,” the disability rating can be used to replace the lower impairment
rating.
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Tennessee provides an interesting example of a bifurcated jurisdiction. The permanent
partial disability rating for an unscheduled injury is based on the impairment rating using
primarily the AMA Guides or the Orthopedic Guides. The percentage of the whole body that is
determined to be impaired is multiplied by 400 weeks to obtain the minimum number of weeks
of benefits. The workers’ compensation commissioner or the courts can apply a multiplier to that
impairment measure, depending upon such factors as the worker’s age, educational attainment
level, skills, and so on. If the worker has returned to his employer at injury with earnings equal to
or above the level at the time of injury, the maximum multiplier that can (though it need not) be
used relative to the impairment rating is 1.5. If the employee has not returned to his pre-injury
employer or is earning below the pre-injury wage, the multiplier can (though it need not) be set
as high as six times the impairment rating. This means that the PPD benefit could be four times
as high if the worker does not return to the injury employer.
Clearly, this is meant to provide a financial incentive to the employer at injury to retain
the injured worker. In 2004, Tennessee enacted HB 3531 which made several changes to the
methods used to compensate these unscheduled injuries. 27 Prior to enactment, the multiplier that
could be applied in cases where the employer did rehire the injured employee was 2.5. By
lowering it to 1.5, this served as a cost saving measure for employers that retain their injured
worker. However, it also widened the potential difference in compensation benefits depending
upon whether the injured worker was rehired. So the cost penalty for not rehiring an injured
worker was potentially increased. In cases where the employee is rehired and earnings are equal
to or greater than the pre-injury level, if the worker is subsequently released or earnings fall
below the pre-injury level before 400 weeks have passed, the disability rating can be
reconsidered. This is a protection for the worker and a measure to encourage the employer to
retain the injured worker subsequent to initially reemploying the person.
A significant advantage of moving to a bifurcated approach is that it would be less
disruptive than switching to another approach for compensating PPDs. Most claims would likely
still be rated as it is done currently, i.e., health care professionals provide the rating of
impairment. Benefits could still be paid in line with current practice. The non-impairment rating
would be used only in the case of those who would be rated based on disability.
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Since the disability rating, where used, would generally be higher than an impairment
rating, there would exist some financial incentive to the employer to assist in returning the
injured worker to employment. The higher claim cost of the disability rated PPD would directly
impact the self insured. Those insuring with the state fund could be impacted through the
experience rating mechanism.
Some workers might adjust their hours of work, or limit their job-hunting efforts in order
to claim higher PPD benefits than if they were to return to work and be rated on an impairment
basis only. A new process would need to be devised to determine appropriate benefits for those
evaluated for disability. Factors that would likely be considered would include the degree of
impairment, the worker’s age and education, the usual retirement age for workers in that
occupation, and the location of the usual residence.
7.E.

Modify the current PPD system so as to more steeply compensate the more

seriously impaired.
In the previous section we speculated that inadequacy of the PPD benefit due to rating
only impairment could be one of the drivers of the utilization of pensions. For unscheduled
benefits, the method Washington employs currently ties benefits to the rating in a linear way.
Thus, a worker with a 20 percent rating receives a benefit that is equivalent to one half that of a
worker with a rating of 40 percent. A number of jurisdictions provide “tiered” or “stepped up”
benefits, such that cases with more serious impairments or disabilities are paid disproportionately
more. For example in Minnesota as the impairment rate increases, the dollar value of each
percentage point increases. In North Dakota, the number of weeks of benefits paid increase
disproportionately as the impairment level is higher. Similarly, in California the number of
weeks of PPD benefits increase as the disability rating is higher, as shown in the following table.
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Range of percentage of permanent disability
incurred
0.25-9.75

Number of weeks for which two-thirds of average
weekly earnings allowed for each 1 percent of
permanent disability within percentage range *
3

10-14.75

4

15-24.75

5

25-29.75

6

30-49.75

7

50-69.75

8

70-99.75

16

*For injuries occurring on or after 1/1/2009.
The numbers set forth in column 2 above are based upon the percentage of permanent disability set forth in
column 1 above and shall be cumulative, and shall increase with the severity of the disability … 28

7.F.

Modify the current PPD benefits approach by paying both an impairment

benefit and an earnings loss benefit.
An alternative approach to determining benefits is one where benefits are paid separately
for the economic loss resulting from the work injury as well as for the impairment. Victoria, and
some other Australian states, pays two types of benefits for a permanent disability. It expressly
pays an impairment benefit as well as one for anticipated earnings losses.
Dual benefits can also be found in some of the “wage-loss” states such as Massachusetts.
A wage-loss state pays benefits based on the earnings lost due to the work injury. Thus, if the
worker is unable to be reemployed following the injury, or does return but with lower weekly
earnings, the compensation benefit replaces some portion of the worker’s foregone earnings.
Typically, an impairment benefit is paid in addition to the wage-loss benefits, though coverage is
often limited to impairments that are listed in a schedule found in the statute, e.g., the loss of (use
of) an extremity or an eye (or a portion of the scheduled body part). Thus injuries to the spine,
brain, lungs or other internal organs do not make the injured worker eligible for an impairment
benefit.
In many instances the impairment benefit payments in “wage-loss” states are small when
viewed next to benefits for comparable losses in states with scheduled benefits for certain
permanent partial disabilities. But the earnings or wage-loss benefits can be relatively large,
28

From section 30 of SB 899 amending sec. 4658 of the Labor Code.
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whether or not the loss is a scheduled body part, particularly if they are paid for a lengthy period
of time. Simply as an example, a worker in Massachusetts whose leg has been amputated in a
work injury is entitled to a specific loss benefit of the state average weekly wage ($1,095 in
2009) multiplied by 39, for a total of $43,200. (In Washington, the loss of a leg provides a
scheduled permanent partial disability benefit of $108,832 for an injury on or after 7/1/2009. If
the injury were not scheduled (not “specific”) there would not be any impairment benefit and the
Massachusetts worker would receive only temporary total disability. For a worker with a nonscheduled injury and able to return to work very quickly at the pre-injury wage level, the wage
loss benefit would be negligible and there would be no impairment benefit. An economics
professor who lost an internal organ in a workplace accident but lost no earnings might not be
eligible for any indemnity benefit.
Washington’s approach differs from a wage-loss state such as Massachusetts in at least
four important ways:
•
•
•

•

It does not limit permanent partial disability benefits to those injuries that are scheduled
or specified in the statute.
It does not set a specified period of time for which a worker can receive temporary total
disability benefits (156 weeks in Massachusetts). Wage-loss states generally set
maximum periods of eligibility for the receipt of wage-loss benefits.
Massachusetts regularly evaluates the temporary disability benefit in terms of what the
injured worker is capable of earning. (In some jurisdictions this would be termed
“notional” or “deemed” earnings.) If the worker is earning less than that, the weekly
benefit is still based on the current earning capacity and not on the actual earnings. In
practice, in some jurisdictions notional earnings are regularly equated with actual
earnings.
Lump-sum settlements can be used to close off insurer liability for indemnity benefits.
There are several things to consider were Washington to look more like one of the typical

dual benefit or wage-loss jurisdictions. Calculating notional earnings can be very challenging
and the source of considerable contention. As an example, if a worker does not return to work at
all after the work injury, is it due to the worker’s lack of interest or enthusiasm for returning to
work, or due to the injury, or weakness in the labor market? If the worker returns to employment
but earns below the pre-injury wage, is the worker capable of earning more, or are actual
earnings equal to his/her capacity to earn (the notional earnings level)? Understand that the issue
can arise multiple times during the course of a single worker’s claim for a work injury as the
worker leaves or changes jobs. One way that wage-loss states have reduced the problem is by
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avoiding it with frequent resort to the use of C&Rs. Without the use of C&Rs, the calculation
and disputation over hypothetical earning power can be a real burden for the workers’
compensation agency.
Setting a cap on the period for which earnings loss disability benefits can be paid would
be difficult for many to accept, considering Washington’s current practices. As noted above,
such a limit on the receipt of temporary total disability benefits would likely lead to a reduction
in the number of claimants seeking and obtaining pensions.
Limiting permanent partial disability solely to scheduled injuries would also be difficult
for many to accept. It seems certain that in the absence of a permanent partial disability benefit
for injuries to internal organs including the spine, claims for pensions would increase.
7.G.

Modify the current PPD benefits approach by paying the existing

impairment benefit but allow an earnings loss benefit in addition in special circumstances.
At least two states, Connecticut and Texas, use this approach and Florida used it for a
number of years. While this option bears an important resemblance to the bifurcated approach
discussed above, it has certain important differences. The key to this approach would be that the
current method of compensating permanent partial disabilities, i.e., basing compensation benefits
on the degree of impairment, would be largely retained, but in special instances, where there is
continuing earnings loss, additional benefits would be possible.
Thus, the advantage of staying with a method that is familiar and accepted exists,
although it could be partially altered if desired. For example, nothing would prevent the benefits
scheme from being modified so as to pay tiered benefits for the impairment rating. However,
what this approach would do is that after the permanent partial disability benefits have expired,
certain injured workers could be eligible for an additional income benefit.
In Texas, this is known as a Supplemental Income Benefit (SIB), and can be paid where
the worker meets all of the following conditions:
1. The worker has not returned to work or has returned but is earning less than 80 percent of
the pre-injury earnings.
2. The worker has not taken a commutation for the permanent partial benefit (known as the
impairment income benefit [IIB]) in Texas.
3. The worker has made a good faith effort to obtain employment commensurate with the
person’s ability to work.
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4. The impairment rating for the impairment income benefit was 15 percent or higher,
according to the rating based on the American Medical Association Guides to the
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (4th Edition).
Income benefits in Texas (temporary, plus impairment, plus any supplemental) cannot be
paid beyond 401 weeks from the date of injury, though Washington could opt for a longer or
shorter period of temporary impairment income benefits or a number of weeks from the date of
injury. Note that the 401 weeks in Texas runs from the date of injury and is not 401 weeks of
benefits. This means, essentially, that there is certain closure in their workers’ compensation
cases, although medical benefits could continue for as long as they are warranted by the
condition. Since the large majority of compensable work injuries involve impairments rated at
less than 15 percent, the SIB is limited to the more serious claims, at least as considered by
impairment standards. It would permit benefits to be paid for more than impairment, i.e., for
disability, when there is no return to work or there is only limited return to work. This approach
discourages the use of lump-sum settlements, though that is not a necessary condition for using
this method.
Ten years after this approach was started, it came in for some general criticism from the
Chief Judge of the Texas Supreme Court. (The “reform” was enacted in 1989, but the effective
date was in 1991.) Judge Hardberger clearly expressed his preference for a disability approach,
rather than an impairment approach to compensating permanent partial disabilities. That aside,
several of his criticisms seem directly pertinent to a state that would consider emulating the
Texas reforms approach. First, he points out the clear problem of the very striking threshold in
that law. An injured worker is entitled to only 42 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits
when the impairment is rated at 14 percent. (Under the Texas statute each point of impairment is
compensated with three weeks of benefits.) A 15 percent rating (or higher) opens the door
potentially to up to 401 weeks of income benefits (although this includes the period of temporary
disability benefits). The step up from 14 percent to 15 percent and higher creates a dramatic
target for the injured worker and for the employer/insurer.
Second, Hardberger notes that the standard of eligibility to gain a supplementary income
benefit is very high, and very few injured workers ultimately receive a SIB when their
impairment income benefit has been exhausted. According to him:
While economics demands that a compensation system place limits on the
benefits provided injured workers, imposing a standard on initial
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qualification for SIBs that precludes over 99% of injured workers from
receiving SIBs violates the primary goal of the system–compensating
injured workers during the period necessary for recovery so that the
injured worker can return to work at the earliest possible time. 29
Moreover, of those who receive the benefit, few are able to retain the benefit for the maximum
possible time. Among other reasons for the SIB benefit being terminated, is that insurers are
“excessively” challenging the continuing eligibility of the SIB recipient according to the Chief
Judge. With that in mind he is critical of the disproportionate amount of contention involving
SIBs, considering the actual number of claims and recipients.
More recent work from Texas has updated some of the findings used by Judge
Hardberger. For workers with injury year of 2005 and who received an Impairment Income
Benefit, 63 percent were rated at 1 to 5 percent, another 24 percent were classified as 6 to10
percent impairment, and 5 percent were rated in the range of 11 to14 percent. 30 As a result, of
those with a permanent partial disability who have received an Impairment Income Benefit, only
8 percent are in the range where a SIB is even possible. Of those who are eligible, some will not
qualify because they have returned to work at or near pre-injury earnings levels. Recall that a
worker is not qualified for a SIB until the Impairment Income Benefit has expired. For a worker
with a 15 or 20 percent impairment rating, 45 or 60 weeks will have passed since that
impairment benefit was started.
8.

Modify the Design of the Existing Pension System
A variety of options exist that would enable Washington to reduce the number of

pensions it would currently be expected to award. Each of those suggested below are based on
existing systems found in one or more states. Directly changing the eligibility for pensions in
Washington could be done alongside some of the options described above. For example,
tightening standards for applicants for pensions could also co-exist with possible changes in the
way temporary total disability is administered. Indirect methods of lowering pension usage exist
that would make them less attractive to potential applicants than they are currently. Specifically,
holding down the value of pensions is going to reduce their cost as well as make them less
attractive to potential applicants. In that regard, one note of caution is needed. If changes are
29
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made such that pension usage is lowered, L&I accomplishes little if it is simply left with
correspondingly more long-term active claims with workers continuing to draw wage-loss
benefits.
The following are some methods that other states have used that limit pension utilization
or pension costs.
8.A.

Limit pensions to those with injuries listed on a schedule.

A number of states limit awards for permanent total disability to workers with the most
severe injuries and which are specified in the statute. Typically, these losses are limited to the
loss (or to the loss of use) of two extremities, both eyes, or damage to the brain. In some cases
the loss of extremities is limited to the amputation of the extremities. Obviously, this sets a very
high bar on access to permanent total disability and would have an enormous impact on the
incidence of pensions in the state of Washington.
Adopting this sort of barrier to pensions can appear to be very harsh in a state accustomed
to a rather liberal threshold. It is not difficult to make the standard seem especially unfair when
an individual worker is clearly permanently and totally impaired, and whose injury is not
included on the schedule. Public reprobation from single cases featured in the media can lead to
backlash from or for elected representatives.
8.B.

Limit pensions to those injuries that result in a high level of impairment.

Such a standard could be applied in one of two ways. First, it could use the one currently
in place in Washington but limit access only to those whose impairment exceeds some threshold.
Such an approach might be less disruptive than some alternative methods to reduce either the
number or the cost of pensions. It would be consistent with measures taken by some other states.
As an example, in West Virginia, a state with very high rates of permanent total disability, the
recent law changes set a 50 percent impairment rate as necessary, but not sufficient grounds for
awarding permanent total disability.
The second way that the standard could be applied would be to make the impairment
threshold the sole factor in awarding a pension. Pennsylvania does not have a category that it
identifies as permanent total disability but it awards lifetime benefits to persons with a 50 percent
or higher impairment rating. (Note that the award can be rebutted even where a 50 percent or
greater impairment exists though this tends to be exceptional.) A worker in California will
receive permanent total disability benefits only where there is an impairment rating of 100
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percent. After a PPD benefit has been fully paid, California also allows the worker to be
considered for a lifetime benefit (i.e., a pension) where the injured worker has an impairment
rating of 70 percent or higher. This benefit is different and the periodic payment is lower than
one where the worker is found to have permanent total disability, i.e., a 100 percent disability
rating. In New Jersey, permanent total disability benefits will be granted only to workers with an
impairment rating of 75 percent or higher. These impairment level thresholds usually depend
upon ratings drawn from some medical guides or other. As such, the ratings are done by health
care professionals, much as it is done today in Washington for permanent partial disability.
In any benefits program, public or private, setting some inclusionary threshold is
tantamount to the setting of a target. (Recall the Texas threshold of 15 percent or more before a
worker can be considered for a SIB.) Suppose Washington would require that a pension could
only be awarded in cases where the worker was impaired at the 50 percent level or higher. The
experience of other states suggests that the claimant will strive to bump up the rating to achieve
the threshold rate if it would otherwise fall below that level. This might be accomplished by
adding on the impairment derived from some other (work-related) injury such as a psychological
one, hearing loss, or any other possible condition to achieve the rating needed to reach the
pensionable level. Similarly, insurer/employers may take extra involvement in claims to keep the
claim from crossing the threshold and becoming costlier. Lawmakers should be made aware of
the tendencies to target that other states have encountered with this type of specific, quantitative
bar.
Such thresholds can also be used in a manner wholly inconsistent with the reason for
their enactment. At one time in the recent past Florida required that a worker have at least a 20
percent impairment rating in order to be considered for a permanent total award. Rather than
serving as a necessary minimum impairment rate, some practitioners in the system treated the 20
percent rating as the rate that would necessarily bring a permanent total disability rating. A result
was that the settlement values in C&Rs (called washouts in Florida) were increased for claims
where the impairment was near to or above 20 percent. 31
Setting a threshold level of impairment, either as a sole condition or as a necessary
condition combined with an employability condition may be acceptable to the public. It seems

31

Barth 1999.

27

L&I Contract No. K1817
likely that the public regards a pension as compensatory for a worker who has sustained a severe
and permanent impairment.
8.C.

Differentiate pension benefits according to the degree of impairment.

An alternative to setting a single threshold for the payment of pensions is one where
pensions could be adjusted based on one or more factors, such as impairment or age. An example
of this can be found in California, where if the injured worker is given a disability rating of 70
percent up to 99.75 percent, the worker is entitled to a lifetime pension following the receipt of
the permanent partial benefit. The worker found to have a permanent total disability is also
entitled to a lifetime pension. In both cases the disabled worker is eligible to receive a benefit
based on two-thirds of the worker’s average weekly wage. However, the permanent total award
is paid subject to a considerably higher weekly maximum than in the case of a pension based on
the permanent partial disability.
A highly imaginative example of this can be seen also in the People’s Republic of China.
Workers with permanent impairments from work injuries receive ratings from 1 to 10 based on a
medical guide, with the lower number representing the most severe cases. Categories 1 to 4 come
closest to what would be considered permanent total disability in many other jurisdictions. A
lump-sum benefit is paid ranging from 24 months of the worker’s pre-injury wage for category 1
impairment to 6 months for a category 10 impairment, subject to a benefit maximum and
minimum level. Additionally, workers who are rated into categories 1 to 4 are entitled to a
monthly pension with the highest pension rate paid for category 1 impairment, declining to the
benefit for a category 4 impairment. Workers with impairments rated in categories 7 to 10 do not
receive any pension for their impairments. 32
Aside from delineating benefits for pensioners according to the extent of the severity of
the impairment there are three other elements of the Chinese approach that are especially
interesting, though their applicability to the Washington system is limited. In the Chinese
approach, persons with category 5 and 6 impairments are not automatically entitled to a pension.
However, if they are not reemployed by their employer, they will be able to receive a pension.
Second, if a worker with a category 5 or 6 impairment does receive a pension for lack of reemployment by the employer at the time of injury, it is the employer that is liable to pay the
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pension, not the employer’s insurance carrier. (This system feature, while interesting seems
particularly unlikely to be adopted in an American state.) Third, with a further nod to
encouraging employers to assist those with less severe impairments (category 7–10) to retain
their employment, the employer is obligated to pay them lump-sum payments if the employment
contract is terminated following the work injury.
8.D.

Limit pensions to those meeting certain specific conditions beyond simply

impairment.
As we noted in our report, Minnesota specifies the somewhat standard list of conditions
that are presumptively deemed permanent total disability, e.g. the loss of both legs, etc.
Alternatively, the worker will be found permanently and totally disabled if the worker is
permanently and totally incapacitated from working at employment that brings the worker
income and there is an impairment rating at or above the 17 percent level, or the 15 percent rate
if older than 50, or at least a 13 percent rate if 55 years of age or older. How those specific
impairment rates or age thresholds were selected is not known to us but they are likely the result
of some political compromises made during the process of enacting the statute.
Several states including Florida and West Virginia place some specific criteria on their
employability standard which can be either a barrier or an easing of limits on the award of
permanent total disability. As an example, in order to be eligible for permanent total disability a
worker in Florida must show that he/she cannot engage even in sedentary employment due to the
physical limitation within a 50-mile radius of the person’s residence. Were the required distance
to be increased, for example to 100 miles, the burden of proving that one meets the permanent
total disability standard would be theoretically increased. Reducing the distance would liberalize
the standard.
The public may also be more accepting of pension claims in cases involving older
workers. Older workers may be perceived as having a greater challenge in gaining reemployment after job loss associated with a work injury. They also have less opportunity to
benefit from rehabilitation programs and fewer years, on average, to draw a lifetime pension.
Thus, including age qualifiers would be a way to limit opposition to stricter standards for
pensions.
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8.E.

Reduce the value of the pension, thereby diminishing its attractiveness to

claimants as well as lowering system costs.
By reducing the value of pensions the tendency will be for fewer workers to seek them.
As a result the cost of pensions can be expected to fall, due both to decreased utilization and
because the pension will provide less to the recipient. We do not discuss the option of simply
lowering either the compensation rate, or the maximum periodic benefit. There are various ways
that pensions can be made less valuable to those with an entitlement. Some of them would
represent less of a hardship for recipients than would others. At one extreme, an absolute ceiling
could be the maximum amount of indemnity benefits payable. However, if set at too low a level,
this could be seen as creating a serious financial burden for the injured worker. Kansas, for
example, has imposed a ceiling of $125,000 on indemnity benefits.
An alternative approach would place some limit on the time for which pensions could be
paid, i.e., rendering these non-lifetime pensions. A number of states have taken steps to eliminate
lifetime pensions. Indiana sets a maximum period for the payment of indemnity benefits of 500
weeks, and this includes weeks of temporary disability as well. Lifelong pensions could be
limited to the cases with the most severe impairments as in South Carolina. There the maximum
period for the receipt of benefits is 500 weeks, but lifetime benefits are paid for work injuries
resulting in paraplegia, quadriplegia, or brain damage (physical only). Recall that California pays
lifetime benefits to those with a 70 percent disability rating or higher, but at a lower benefit than
for a worker found to be permanently and totally disabled, i.e., 100 percent disabled.
The primary problem with an approach that places a time limit on pensions, or setting
some (low) ceiling on benefits is that it can result in injured workers being left destitute. This
would seem particularly harsh in cases where the worker’s impairment was severe. An
alternative might be to set some type of time or indemnity benefit limit that is imposed only in
claims where relatively minor impairment exists. In this way Washington might be able to
reduce the number of pensions while doing no damage to workers with high levels of
impairment.
8.F.

Consider broader application of offsets as a way to limit the attractiveness of

pensions.
Washington currently offsets the pension benefit by the amount of old age benefits under
Social Security that the worker receives or is entitled to receive. A number of jurisdictions go
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beyond this on the theory that at some point the worker likely would have ceased working had
there been no work injury. States including Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Kentucky, and
North Dakota terminate the permanent total disability benefit when the worker reaches
retirement age or becomes eligible for old age Social Security benefits. A number of states offset
the permanent total disability benefit for a variety of employer funded benefits including
privately purchased disability insurance, private pensions, and the employer funded portion of
Social Security benefits.
8.G.

Another method to reduce the number of pensions that is within the existing

means of L&I is to rigorously and frequently review the continuing eligibility of pensioners.
We are not aware of how much of L&I’s staff and other resources are currently devoted
to re-evaluating workers subsequent to the decision to award a pension. Certainly, some
instances of disability are so substantial that it is clear from the time that a pension is granted that
the individual will never return to gainful employment. Additionally, the process of arriving at
the pension is already such an extended one that it is not likely that many cases would justify
revocation. What do the data show regarding past instances where benefits were terminated? Are
income tax records of pension recipients routinely and regularly monitored? Are medical
examinations ever performed in a reconsideration process?
8.H.

Align the allowance of a pension with the awarding of a Social Security

Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefit.
Only one state (Florida) formally adopted this method, so far as we know, and ultimately
discarded it. When this approach was first enacted its supporters expected that the incidence of
permanent total awards would decline. Yet from the outset there was uncertainty if the awarding
of SSDI was a necessary condition or a sufficient condition for Florida to award a permanent
total disability benefit. The advantage of this approach is perceived as being that a more
consistent and uniform criterion would be used to determine whether or not to award a pension.
A disadvantage is that this important determination could be taken out of the hands of state
officials, in whole or in part, and left to a federal official or a federal process court. Moreover,
the belief that the SSDI determination is uniform in its application of criteria both across time
and geographic areas is subject to serious challenge.
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9.

Actively Promote Return-to-Work Outcomes
In sections 6 through 8 above, much of the discussion has focused on the eligibility for

pensions, as well as the ways that the entire linked system of indemnity benefits affects the
number of pensions in Washington. It has not described the options that could reduce the number
of pensions by directly returning to work a larger share of injured workers, particularly those
with long-term cases. Clearly, accomplishing that is one of the central goals of the vocational
rehabilitation program operated for injured workers. A new approach to vocational rehabilitation
in Washington was recently piloted and is now operative. It is not likely that new options will be
considered before that one has been initially evaluated at least.
But a seemingly endless number of variations in incentives and disincentives exist to
encourage return to work outcomes. The employer at the time of injury, or employers overall can
be incentivized to aid in the goal of moving individuals back into the labor market. These
policies include insurance premium reductions, tax benefits, and wage cost and special
equipment subsidies for those that employ or reemploy the work-disabled.
Though these programs can be applied with various levels of support and qualifications,
two generalizations seem to be warranted. First, few of these programs appear to have made a
large positive impact on returning sizable numbers of injured workers to work. Second, the lack
of substantial success does not prove that such programs are inherently futile. Instead, a different
lesson that could be drawn is that the commitment to these programs has been inadequate and
that larger, more generous, or better administered programs could possibly be successful.
Finally, one of the arguments against compromise and release settlements is that their use
actually can be inimical to return-to-work programs. It is not unusual for the recipient of the
lump-sum benefit to agree that the employment relationship will end and no further legal action
will be taken against the employer/insurer. Thus, the worker receives the cash, is terminated
from or leaves employment, and then may subsequently re-enter the labor market in search of a
new position. This need not happen but some employers strongly want the injured worker not to
return to their pre-injury employment. One can imagine a number of reasons for that motivation,
but the end result would be less positive return-to-work outcomes. Of course, the C&R also
would eliminate the likelihood that a pension would follow the agreement.
One way to induce the employer to help an injured worker return to work is to reduce the
cost of the permanent partial disability benefit in instances where return to work occurs. We saw
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this in the Tennessee provisions for PPD awards earlier. In the 2004 California reform
legislation, SB 899, a provision was included that would reduce the size of the weekly permanent
disability benefit by 15 percent in the event that injured worker was re-employed or increase it
by 15 percent if there was no offer of re-employment: 33
(3) (A) If, within 60 days of a disability becoming permanent and
stationary, an employer offers the injured employee regular work,
modified work, or alternative work, in the form and manner
prescribed by the administrative director, for a period of at least
12 months, and regardless of whether the injured employee accepts
or rejects the offer, each disability payment remaining to be paid
to the injured employee from the date the offer was made shall be
paid in accordance with paragraph (1) and decreased by 15
percent.
(B) If the regular work, modified work, or alternative work is
terminated by the employer before the end of the period for which
disability payments are due the injured employee, the amount of
each of the remaining disability payments shall be paid in
accordance with paragraph (1) and increased by 15 percent. An
employee who voluntarily terminates employment shall not be
eligible for payment under this subparagraph. This paragraph
shall not apply to an employer that employs fewer than 50
employees. 34
This reform was expected to lead to a reduction in permanent disability costs of about 3
percent, but the Commission on Health and Safety and Workers’ Compensation reports that it
“appears to be increasing costs.” 35 In cases where the weekly benefit is modified, upward
adjustments of 15 percent occur more often than where it is lowered. Moreover, in most
instances there is no adjustment, upward or downward to the permanent disability benefit. The
Commission concludes “As of late 2009 it is doubtful that the two-tiered PD system is an
effective incentive to promote RTW.” 36
There is no known system that is reliably able to effectuate a return to work after three or
four years (or more) of disability compensation. In fact, the major focus of private disability
33
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plans for such claims is to help the claimant qualify for public disability benefits; in other words,
shift the cost burden to someone else. 37 Traditionally, vocational rehabilitation programs have
been used in workers’ compensation programs after maximum medical improvement when it is
clear that the disabled worker has no significant probability of returning to their previous
employment. Attention is customarily centered on an assessment of the residual capacity of the
injured worker and the design of a suitable training or work experience program for alternative
placement. In Washington, as in many other states, vocational rehabilitation has frequently
served as a temporary way station on the way to a pension award. In some instances this has
occurred multiple times in the same claim.
An effective way to reduce the number of pensions or long-term time-loss claims is with
a disability management program that prevents work-injury claims from getting to that point.
Disability management refers to a set of practices designed to minimize the disabling impact of
injuries and health conditions that arise during the course of employment. Because of the
multitude of such practices, it is actually a very difficult term to define precisely. Disability
management should be differentiated from traditional safety and prevention activities, which aim
to prevent an accident or disease from occurring in the first place; although there are prevention
aspects to disability management. It should also be differentiated from medical and vocational
rehabilitation efforts, which take the injury or disease as given and attempt to overcome or
mitigate the long-term disabling effects; although disability management arose in a vocational
rehabilitation context and is frequently carried out by rehabilitation professionals. Last, but not
least, disability management is not synonymous with “return to work” even though this is one of
the main indicators of success for disability management programs.
In many ways this would be a very aggressive approach to reducing the number of
pension claims in the State of Washington. It would require the most change in orientation,
structure, and function at L&I, but it also promises the biggest payoff. Disability management
would begin at the front end of the claims-handling process, rather than at the back end where
pensions are awarded. However, a full disability management program could be instituted by
L&I, building on the foundation of the existing Early Return-To-Work Program which seeks to
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make an intervention at the 14th day of disability. Some examples of system-wide disability
management programs in workers’ compensation systems include the following.
9.A.

Ohio Health Partnership Plan.

One interesting application of disability management principles has been adopted in
Ohio. This program began in 1993, starting as a managed care program designed to improve
medical care for injured workers. It has evolved into a full disability management program with
extensive support available from the Ohio Bureau of Workers Compensation (BWC).
Besides assistance to individual employers in establishing a disability management
program, BWC provides risk analysis, a list of approved Managed Care Organizations (MCOs),
assistance with administration of drug-testing programs, access to local occupational health nurse
case managers, management of local medical provider relationships, on-site nurse staffing, and
other services. 38 One MCO’s disability management program offers all of the following services,
which can be financed with a grant from the Ohio BWC, resulting in a low-cost way for
employers to gain control of their future workers’ compensation costs:
•

To complete a Disability Management cost benefit analysis that documents
the employer’s current costs associated with work related disabilities and
duration, as well as establishing an on-going risk reduction goal of the
program.
To develop a comprehensive Workers’ Compensation Administrative
Guideline and employee Claim Packet enabling management and workforce
to better understand the steps to take when filing a claim and treating a
work related injury.
To develop a Disability Management Administrative Guideline allowing
management to understand and control all aspects of injury management
reporting, documentation, and provider compliance.
To develop a brief employee procedure for Workers’ Compensation filing as
well as Disability Management Plan compliance to be documented in the
existing employee manual/ handbook.
OHP will provide a standard job analysis format to document essential
functions and physical demands of select jobs in each department. OHP will
establish categories of jobs to be analyzed that enable the employer to
accommodate the majority of the injured worker’s restrictions. These
categories will offer a transition of physical demand progression.
To conduct a case review on all current ‘experience claims’ to determine an
appropriate Disability Management Plan for each eligible claim.

•

•

•

•

•

38

See http://www.ohiobwc.com.

35

L&I Contract No. K1817
•

To analyze the feasibility of on-site rehabilitation services and to deploy
cost effective and pro-active assistance to return the injured worker to
productive employment.
To supply the employer with effective disability management training to
employees, supervisors, and management.
To obtain a BWC Transitional Work Program Grant on behalf of the
employer to cover the OHP consulting costs of developing the program. 39

•
•

In addition, the Ohio BWC offers a “10-Step Business Plan for Safety: A Guide for Developing
Organizational Excellence in Safety and Health Management.” This presents a comprehensive
approach to disability prevention and management at the firm level.
Ohio is also rather unique in publishing a “report card” on the managed care
organizations (MCOs) operating in Ohio. This report is designed to assist employers in selecting
the MCO to handle their workers’ compensation claims. The current version reports:
•
•
•

The number of Ohio employers assigned to the MCO;
The number of claims handled in the past 13 months;
Timing of the first report (average number of days between the date of injury and
claim filing with BWC);
First report turnaround efficiency (the number of days from receiving the notice of
injury from the employer to the date they file the claim with BWC);
The optimal return to work score, which is based on comparison against established
benchmarks, which are denominated as ‘loosely managed’ to ‘well managed.’ 40

•
•

The Ohio WCB publishes these performance statistics on their website annually for each MCO
(currently 18 in number) who is operating in the state.
9.B.

Massachusetts Qualified Loss Management Program.

One of the most imaginative applications of disability management programs at the
system level is the Qualified Loss Management Program (QLMP) for assigned risk employers in
Massachusetts. In 1990, under extreme cost pressures and a rapidly expanding residual market
for employers unable to secure workers’ compensation insurance in the voluntary market, the
state adopted a program for providing premium credits for residual market employers adopting
disability management techniques. The program is administered by the Workers’ Compensation
Rating and Inspection Bureau of Massachusetts.
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A credit (i.e., in advance of actual performance) of up to 10 percent of the workers’
compensation insurance premium was offered to employers who would engage a certified
consultant to implement a “loss control management” program. At the start, Massachusetts even
offered retroactive premium adjustments, so long as the employer participated for at least six
months of the year. Furthermore, this credit could be maintained for three years, provided the
loss control program continued in effect for the employer. However, the third year only carried
50 percent of the credit as the goal was to improve employer performance and depopulate the
assigned risk pool. 41
It was expected that the program would pay for itself and that employers would soon
realize that they could sustain the disability management efforts on their own. Subsequently,
based upon results for the first three years, the program was expanded to a fourth year with 25
percent of the original credit available in year four. In addition, the maximum premium credit
was increased to 15 percent to provide even greater incentive for employers. The 1993
amendments also provided that the premium credit could continue even after a subscriber
“succeeded” in moving to the voluntary market.
Most interesting as a program design element, the actual size of the premium credit is
determined by the average credit factor assigned to the loss management firm, not to the
employer’s actual performance. Provided the loss management firm certifies full QLMP
participation, the performance improvements of other firms provides the basis for the credit. So
the system is built upon the assumption that disability management practitioners can replicate
their loss management performance in any firm.
The requirements for QLMP certification included:
1) A structured approach to safe work practices;
2) Action plans for post-injury response; and
3) Early return to work provisions.
These are the classic elements of any disability management program.
The program produced immediate and sustained benefits for participating employers
according to an outside evaluation. 42 In the first year of the program (September 1990 through
41
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August 1991), QLMP participants showed 13 percent more improvement than non-participating
employers in the loss ratio (ratio of incurred losses to standard premium) at first report. In the
second year, the same cohort of employers showed 36 percent improvement, and in the third year
40 percent improvement over non-participating employers, all at first report. Further, these
results held up through second and third report, i.e., as claims matured over time. So there was
clearly an improving workers’ compensation result over time for participating employers.
This program is still in effect in Massachusetts, and was subsequently somewhat
emulated by workers’ compensation systems in West Virginia, New Hampshire, Missouri, and
Wisconsin.
9.C.

Oregon Disability Management Program.

In addition to the “Employer-at-Injury” program described above in section 6.B.4.a,
Oregon has two other legs on its disability management program. They use “Vocational
Assistance” to promote reemployment for the most severe disabilities. Those claims that receive
vocational assistance are required to demonstrate “substantial handicap.” This means that their
permanent work-related disability prevents re-employment in any job that pays more than 80
percent of their pre-injury wage. 43
Vocational assistance benefits include worker subsistence (wage-loss) payments during
training, purchase of needed goods and services to facilitate the rehabilitation plan, and
professional rehabilitation services which includes plan development, counseling and guidance,
and placement services. Workers who are eligible for vocational assistance are not required to
use these benefits, and in fact since 1995 less than one-third of eligible workers have completed
a vocational assistance plan. 44
The reduction in vocational rehabilitation since 1987 in Oregon means that relatively few
workers benefit. In 2007, there were only 740 injured workers eligible for vocational assistance
in Oregon. Time-loss payments for all vocational assistance claims closed in 2007 were only
$4.5 million, plus $2.3 million for vocational rehabilitation services, and $1.7 million for
supporting purchases. A “Program Evaluation Model” using 13 quarters of earnings data
following a worker’s injury indicated that 71 percent of workers injured in 2003 who completed
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a vocational assistance plan had been reemployed by 2007 compared to 40 percent of those who
had not completed a plan. This is a very substantial difference for seriously disabled workers.
However, this only amounted to 132 workers. 45
In between the Employer-at-Injury program and Vocational Assistance lies Oregon’s
“Preferred Worker” program, enacted in 1990. The Preferred Worker program seeks to sustain
disabled workers in modified regular or new employment as soon as permanent medical
restrictions are known. The worker is given a preferred worker identification card when it is
determined by the insurer that the worker will not be able to return to their regular job. Injured
workers may also request designation as a preferred worker.
There are several benefits available to an employer who hires one of the certified
preferred workers. First, there is a 50 percent wage subsidy for six months. In addition, costs of
worksite modification to accommodate the injured worker as well as other costs that might be
incurred by either the worker or the employer are covered. Last, an employer of a preferred
worker does not pay workers’ compensation insurance premiums for that worker for the next
three years. This premium exemption also transfers to another employer for an additional three
years if the worker leaves the first employer. There is no restriction on when preferred worker
benefits must commence; it is essentially a lifetime endowment for the worker.
From the program’s inception in 1990, the preferred worker eligible population grew to
over 4,400 by 1995. Preferred worker contracts (i.e., employed injured workers) reached a peak
of 2,227 in 1996. Utilization of the program has receded to approximately 2,000 eligibles and
600 starting contracts per year since 2002. For workers injured in 2003, the Oregon Program
Evaluation Model (utilizing employment and earnings in the 13th quarter following injury)
indicates that 75 percent of preferred workers with contracts were reemployed in 2007, versus 52
percent of registered preferred workers who did not use the program. 46
With their advanced Program Evaluation Model, Oregon authorities are able to look
across all three components of their disability management approach. Among all closed disabling
claims in Oregon about 14 to 16 percent receive some return-to-work program treatment by the
fourth year following their injury. 47 We believe this to be the highest penetration rate for
45
46
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disability management techniques observed anywhere among workers’ compensation programs
and justifies the reputation of Oregon as the return-to-work state.
9.D.

Other Examples

While some of Oregon’s results seem promising, it must be noted that variations of the
preferred worker model have been tried in other states, including Florida, Michigan, California,
and Washington without equally satisfying results. In fact, the program has been dropped in
Florida and Michigan as ineffective. Florida’s experience may be instructive, and an evaluation
of the state’s return-to-work programs has been conducted by Aubrey Jewett. 48
In 1993 Florida law was enacted that employers with more than 50 employees were
obligated to rehire their injured workers. It also put into place a preferred worker program that
was initiated after some positive results had been reported for the Oregon law. According to
Jewett, the obligation to rehire legislation was stifled by the business community, and the State
Department of Labor did not succeed in promulgating any regulations to implement the law. The
primary objection of employers was that the provision could leave them vulnerable to law suits
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). If an employer did not rehire an injured
worker, even the costs of defending itself against a worker’s possible action at law could be
significant.
Rules for the preferred worker program were promulgated by November of 1994.
However, as with the case of the obligation to re-hire law, employers were leery of the program.
If a job applicant indicated that s/he was a preferred worker, the ADA would inhibit or prevent
the employer from following that up with questions probing the worker’s post injury capability at
least until a tentative or preliminary job offer was made. In its four years only one employer was
reimbursed under the Florida preferred worker program. Funding for the preferred worker
program was ended as of 1/1/1998. According to Professor Jewett, employers in Florida also
indicated that the incentives for employers to participate in the preferred worker program were
inadequate and substantially less than in the Oregon program.
Aside from the possible modification of the permanent disability benefit relating to return
to work, California has employed several other approaches, some of which parallel measures
found in Oregon and other jurisdictions. In 2003 the Vocational Rehabilitation Program was
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repealed by statute and replaced by the Supplemental Job Displacement benefit. This benefit
provides a worker with a voucher for education or skills enhancement for those injured on or
after January 1, 2004, who cannot return to their at-injury employer. The size of the voucher
depends upon the estimated degree of disability. Additionally, the law provides worksite
modification reimbursements of up to $2,500 for employers of 50 or fewer employees.
Considering both these programs, as well as the permanent disability benefit modifications, the
Commission on Health and Safety and Workers’ Compensation in 2010 has concluded that “It is
doubtful that any of the direct approaches have improved California’s RTW rate.” 49 Note that
California is considered to have a low return-to-work rate compared with other states.
The approach taken to the preferred worker program in North Dakota also somewhat
parallels the Oregon approach. Benefits to the employer include:
•

•
•

•
•
•

The employer of the injury is not eligible for program participation with its own
employees unless the employer of injury has identified permanent alternate work for the
injured employee.
Premium exemption: Upon hiring a Preferred Worker, the employer will not be charged
premium on the Preferred Worker's salary for up to three years.
Wage reimbursement: WSI may reimburse the employer up to 50% of wages (not to
exceed the States Average Weekly Wage) at the time of employment start date. The wage
reimbursement period is not to exceed 26 consecutive weeks.
If a worker has a catastrophic injury as defined in the statute the wage subsidy duration is
52 consecutive weeks with a reimbursement rate of 75 percent.
Claim costs exemption: If the Preferred Worker sustains a new on-the-job injury during
the premium exemption period, the claim costs will not be charged to the employer.
Reimbursement for worksite modifications: Upon approval, participating employers may
be reimbursed for worksite modifications.
North Dakota provides benefits for workers who participate in their Preferred Worker

program as well. To enter the program the injured worker must have some permanent work
restrictions and has not returned to the pre-injury employment. These benefits include:
• Work Search Allowance: Once the vocational assessment is received and an injured
worker is deemed eligible for the program, a work search allowance will be provided to
the preferred worker to be utilized for appropriate interviewing clothing, uniforms, travel
expenses, or other items deemed mandatory for employment. Maximum benefit in this
category is $250.
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• Work Search Assistance: An opportunity to work closely with a reemployment specialist
who will assist in the preparation of job search skills, job leads, and job placement
utilizing the workers knowledge, skills, and capabilities.
• Certification, Licensure or Related Testing Costs: Testing for certifications, licensure or
related testing requirements for employment may be reimbursed. This includes physical
examinations or membership fees required for the job. Maximum benefit in the category
is $500.
• Moving Expenses: Relocation expenses to move the household to the locale where the
preferred worker has actually located work and the distance is greater to or equal than 35
miles from the primary residence.
• Reimbursement for Lodging, Meals and Travel Expenses Relating to On-The-Job
Training: The state may reimburse the preferred worker for lodging, meals and travel
expenses (public transportation or mileage) to attend on-the-job training.
• Tools and Equipment: Upon WSI approval, the preferred worker may be reimbursed for
tools, equipment or starter sets deemed mandatory for employment. Maximum benefit in
this category is $2,500.
• Union Dues: Includes initiation fee and one month of current union dues.
There are currently approximately 600 workers in the program, which began in 2001. In
2009 the law was amended and a number of new benefits for workers were added and some
others were made more generous. This was done in order to widen the program’s appeal to
injured workers. Some measures to enhance the attractiveness of the program for employers were
also undertaken at that time. The program appears to be popular in the state. 50 As in all states
with such programs there exists a continuing challenge to educate potential users about the
nature of the program and the expected benefits.
These examples from specific workers’ compensation programs illustrate the degree to
which disability management principles can be integrated with public policy on a voluntary
basis, potentially with direct financial rewards for successful participation. We hope that
policymakers in Washington can find some interesting options here, but we repeat that we do not
endorse any particular approach.

50

Thanks to Mr. Brad Sibla, the preferred worker program coordinator for North Dakota Workforce Safety
& Insurance for providing some of this information.
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